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The desirability of WTO membership for China depends on whether its economic successes have been 
the result of its discovery of new institutional forms (e.g. dual track pricing, SOE contracts, and fiscal 
contracts) that are optimal for China's particular economic circumstances, or have been the result of the 
convergence of its economic institutions to those of a typical advanced member of WTO.  If the 
experimentalist interpretation of China's phenomenal growth is correct, then WTO membership is a 
negative development because it could be a straitjacket for WTO-enforced institutional harmonisation that 
would constrain China's scope for experimentation.  But if the experimentalist interpretation is wrong, 
then WTO membership is a positive development that will lock China on to the path of deepening 
economic reform.  We assess several recent claims of China's economic exceptionalism, and conclude 
that they neglected the considerable costs associated with the use of these innovative mechanisms (which 
have led to the repeal of every one of these "optimal" mechanisms) and that these mechanisms were 
unlikely to have produced positive results in the transition economies in Europe.  Because a major reason 
for the failure of Gorbachev's reforms was opposition from the entrenched interests within the ruling 
structure, China's forthcoming WTO accession could be seen as an attempt by reformers to lock economic 
policies on to a market-oriented course that is costly to reverse. 
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The phenomenal growth of China in the last two decades is not in much dispute. What has been the 
subject of vigorous research and of even more vigorous debate are the causes of this phenomenal growth.  
While there is broad agreement that the most important part of the answer is the marketization of the 
economy and its integration into the international division of labour, there is much less agreement over 
the relative contributions of the many economic mechanisms that were put into motion by these two 
policies.  For example, while virtually all economists would agree with the proposition that complete 
price flexibility is to be preferred over complete price fixity, there can be disagreement over, the optimal 
speed at which price flexibility is to be introduced; and the economic mechanism through which a given 
speed is to be implemented.   
Suppose that even if agreement could be reached, 20 percent of prices are to be decontrolled in each 
of the first two years instead of 5 percent or fifty percent each year, there still remains the choice of 
totally freeing the prices of 20 percent of the commodities or of allowing twenty percent of each 
commodity to be sold at freely-determined prices.  In this case, there is agreement over the general 
principle of price flexibility, but not necessarily over the implementation of this principle. 
Of course, there is then the more difficult issue of whether the same economic mechanism can be 
applied successfully across different economic sectors.  This is clearly the case in the use of the “contract 
responsibility system” (CRS) to implement the principle of decentralized decision making.  Many 
researchers will agree that the household responsibility system unleashed sustained productivity 
improvements in the agricultural sector that boosted economic growth substantially, especially in the 
1978-84 period; but many fewer researchers can agree that the enterprise responsibility system generated 
impressive productivity gains in the state enterprise sector that lifted the overall growth rate significantly, 
even in the 1984-88 period.  Clearly, the difference in outcomes could be due to a combination of the 
differences in the way that CRS was implemented in each sector and in the structure of agricultural and 
industrial production.  While descriptive differences are obvious and many on the implementation front 
and on the structural front, our priors are that the production relationships in agriculture and industry are 
so different that there is a different optimal economic mechanism for implementing the “decentralized 
decision-making” principle in each sector. 
The difference in sectoral outcomes to the CRS mechanism raises many intriguing but disturbing 
hypotheses.  Possibly the most relevant of these hypotheses for China on the eve of its WTO accession is 
whether the optimal economic mechanism for a particular sector in a foreign country can also be the 
optimal, or even a useful, economic mechanism for the same sector in China.  Specifically, is it possible   2
that (almost) complete marketization and total internationalization of economic activities may be optimal 
for the capitalist East Asian economies but disastrous for China's economy?  Is this the reason for the 
vastly different output responses of China in 1979 and of Poland in 1990 when they embarked on their 
market-oriented reform paths?  More specifically, what are the optimal degree of marketization and the 
optimal degree of international integration for each country?  In light of China’s high growth since 1978, 
is China already at, or already close to, the optimal degree on these two fronts such that entry into WTO 
and the harmonization of Chinese economic institutions to WTO-specified institutional forms will cause 
an overshooting of marketization and internationalization? 
The aims of this paper are to argue that China is still below the optimal degree of marketization and 
international integration, and that the chosen method of WTO membership to advance marketization and 
integration is a desirable one, conditional upon supplementary policies being enacted to reduce the 
adjustment costs.  In our view, even with WTO membership, China stands a much greater chance of 
under-shooting on both fronts than of over-shooting.  Our case for China’s WTO membership is based on 
the proposition that China’s economic progress since 1978 was the result of China’s institutional 
convergence to a prototype WTO market economy rather than the result of China's economic institutions 
being different from those of a prototype WTO economy.  We will make our case by examining some 
claims in the literature of Chinese economic exceptionalism as being the cause of the phenomenal growth. 
It is important to state at the outset that we agree with some important parts in these claims of Chinese 
economic exceptionalism.  While we recognize China has had the luxury of more than one feasible path 
to a prototype WTO market economy, we see that the costs and unsustainability of some of these 
alternative feasible paths have not been adequately laid out.  Furthermore, while we also recognize that 
the prototype WTO market economy accommodates a variety of institutional forms, we hold that there are 
some key features of a prototype WTO economy that are important for China to converge to.  These key 
institutional features include near absence of state intervention in price-setting, dominance of private 
ownership, primary reliance on capital markets to allocate investment capital, and overwhelming even-
handedness in legal treatment of state capital, domestic private capital, and foreign capital.  China has 
almost achieved the first feature, has made some big strides since 1993 on the second, and is still largely 
amiss on the third and fourth. 
Before starting the discussion, we would like to say a few words about the obfuscating terminology 
that the debate over transition strategies has generated.  A wealth of oxymora has been conjured up 
because protagonists have sought to attach undeserved positive connotations to their viewpoints.  A 
number of authors have labeled rapid, comprehensive reforms (big bang reforms) as top-down reforms, 
and slow, partial reforms (incremental reforms) as bottom-up reform.  Big bang reforms were hence 
associated with a reform style that is reminiscent of central planning coercion, and incremental reforms   3
with a democratic trial-and-error market-learning process.  These two associations are largely false and 
self-contradictory as suggested by the following two considerations. 
First, the reliance on markets to allocate resources represents decentralized economic management 
achieved by empowering individual initiatives.  Markets are naturally occurring phenomenon because 
they render both buyers and sellers better off.  The only time when markets are absent is when they are 
suppressed by the central plan of the state.  Marketization means allowing the bottom-up process to run its 
natural course.  Second, reform of a centrally-planned economy means the marketisation of economic 
transactions and the deep entrenchment of market-supporting institutions such as the criminal justice 
system to maintain law and order, commercial courts to enforce contracts, bankruptcy courts to encourage 
prudent lending and enable fresh starts for entrepreneurs, and social safety nets to lower the costs of 
resource reallocation.  By its nature, marketization can be accomplished fairly quickly if desired, but the 
firm entrenchment of market-supporting institutions cannot be achieved quickly even if desired. 
In short, big bang reforms (quick marketisation) means the unleashing of the bottom-up process of 
individual initiatives on a grand scale, while incremental reforms (slow marketisation) means incremental 
legalization of the bottom-up process.  The amazing semantic sleight of hand that has happened is that the 
advocates of gradual reform have identified themselves as advocates of the bottom-up approach to 
economic management!  It is time for the misleading terms of “top-down reform” and “bottom-up 
reform” to be dropped from the transition strategy debate. 
The two words “evolutionary” and “path-dependent” are often encountered in the transition literature, 
and while they are always accurate, they are not always useful.  In the strictest sense, rational 
policymaking is evolutionary and path-dependent by necessity.  Policymaking has to be evolutionary 
because new exogenous shocks are always appearing, and it is nearly always path-dependent because 
reversals can be expensive, if not impossible.  For example, China’s tariff policy is contingent on whether 
China is already a WTO member or not. 
There is one important sense in which the term “evolutionary” is analytically useful.  Take the case of 
bankruptcy procedures.  They were not needed during the planning period, and so they were non-existent 
prior to 1990.  With the transition to a market economy, the state faces two policy choices.  The first 
policy is to adopt the bankruptcy procedures of another country after modifying them to accommodate 
relevant differences in national circumstances, and then to continue to modify them in light of experience.  
The second policy is to rely on the bottom-up process in the most fundamental sense by encouraging its 
citizens to come up with private contractual arrangements that would cover the contingency of financial 
difficulties that the borrowers might encounter.  Comparing these two policies, we see that the first 
promotes institutional evolution in the local sense, and the second choice promotes institutional evolution 
in the global sense.   4
In practice, institutional evolution in the local sense entails a pro-active state in the sphere of 
institution building where the usual operational principle is to adopt a foreign prototype and then modify 
it through practice.
1  Institutional evolution in the global sense, on the other hand, requires a state that is 
agnostic and passive about institution building because of its unbridled faith that the demand for 
institutions will inevitably induce the appropriate institutional innovations.  Sachs and Woo (2000) called 
the first approach “the convergence school of institution building”, and the second approach the 
“experimentalist school of institution building”. 
The misunderstanding over these two approaches to institution building has caused the biggest 
obfuscation in the debate over transition strategies for China.  The transition debate for China has 
primarily been a debate over the origins of institutions and the desired direction for institutional evolution 
and only very secondarily been a debate over the speed of implementing the reform program, even though 
the debate did focus on speed in the beginning.  The real question in the transition debate on China still 
remains whether a third way exists between socialist planning and capitalist markets. 
In sharp contrast, the fundamental academic issue in the post-mortem debate on transition strategies 
for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) is the desired speed for institutional changes 
because leading EEFSU economists (such as Janos Kornai, 1992) take it for granted that there is no third 
way.  There is clearly no simple answer to the speed issue because "the transition from socialism to 
capitalism... is a curious amalgam of revolution and evolution."
2  Some reforms, such as macroeconomic 
stabilization, have to be done very quickly, and some reforms, such as privatization, have to be done 
much slower; and in all cases, the decision on speed has to take into account the administrative capacity 
of the state and the political situation in the country. 
It is clear that most of EEFSU have embraced the convergence school of institution building (albeit 
with different speeds in implementation), but would it be accurate to say that China has followed the 
experimentalist school of institution building, since many of the critics of quick marketization have 
explained the gradual pace of Chinese reform as being due to the time-consuming process of 
experimentation to discover policies and institutions that are optimal for China’s economic situation?  If 
the experimentalist interpretation of China's phenomenal growth is correct, then China's forthcoming 
WTO membership is a negative development because it could be a straitjacket that would constrain 
China's scope for experimentation.  But if the experimentalist interpretation is wrong, then WTO 
membership is a positive development that will lock China on to the path of deepening economic reform 
and openness. 
                                                 
1 The earliest country in the industrial age to implement this operational principle successfully and hence attain first  
world status is Japan. 
2 Kornai (2000, pp. 25)   5
Sachs and Woo (2000) presented a comprehensive survey of China's performance up to 1994 and 
concluded that China's phenomenal growth had come from its convergence to a prototype WTO 
economy.  Therefore, another objective of this paper is to assess several recent interesting additions to the 
literature to see whether the Sachs-Woo conclusion still holds and, hence, whether optimism about 
China's WTO accession is still justified. 
 
2. The Feasibility and Optimality of the Dual Track Reform Strategy 
Strictly speaking, "dual track" does not capture the complexity of China's reform policies.  In 
different periods, there was dual-track for the pricing of inputs, output, and foreign exchange; five-track 
for ownership in the service and light industrial sectors (individual, state, collective, private and foreign); 
multiple-track for revenue-sharing between the centre and the provinces (Guangdong and Fujian signed 
lump sum revenue contracts with a 5-year duration, and the other provinces paid varying proportions of 
their revenue to the centre); multi-track for international trade and foreign direct investments (with 
Shenzhen having the most liberal regime for the longest time); and a single-track, until recently, for 
interest rates and ownership in the banking sector. 
In this section, we will focus mainly on the dual-track price reform.
3  The academic analysis of 
China's dual track price system (DTPS) has gone through two phases: the partial-equilibrium approach 
and the general equilibrium approach.  Proponents of the DTPS describe it as a Pareto-improving way of 
introducing price flexibility that encourages growth without arousing political opposition from entrenched 
interest groups.  We find this claim of gain-without-pain to be either factually wrong or politically 
implausible. 
 
The Partial Equilibrium Analysis (PEA) of Dual Track Pricing 
The analytics can be summarized by the following example when there is a light industrial good, and 
a heavy industrial good, with the following supply and demand relationships in a free market setting.  For 
the light industrial good, we assume  
supply curve (marginal cost curve):    P = 2 + Q 
demand curve:        P = 12 – Q where Q is in units of millions.  
 
For the heavy industrial good, we assume 
supply curve (marginal cost curve):    P = 3 + 2Q 
demand curve:        P = 12 – Q where Q is in units of millions  
 
                                                 
3 This part draws upon Woo (2000).   6
Under the free market, see Diagrams 1 and 2, in the light industrial good market: P = 7 and Q = 5; and in 
the heavy industrial good market: P = 9 and Q = 3 
 
For the Central Plan Situation, assume the modus operandi to be where the planner picks the output level 
in each industry and sets the plan price to equate revenue with production costs of the output quota.  
Furthermore, assume that the planner creates the typical Stalinist outcome where the light industrial good 
is under-produced vis-a-vis the free market situation, and the heavy industrial good is over-produced vis-
a-vis the free market situation.
4 
Say, for light industrial goods, the planner picks Q = 2, and hence sets P = 7.  The result is a black 
market price of 10 with the marginal cost being 4.  And, say, for heavy industrial goods, the planner picks 
Q = 2, and hence sets P = 7.  The result is a black market price of 8 with the marginal cost of 11. 
 
The Dual-Track Price System (DTPS) is the situation where the producer is allowed to sell his above-
quota output at a freely determined price.  Then for the light industrial good, we have: 
market price      = 7 
market quantity   = 3 
plan price      = 3 
plan quantity       = 2. 
 
The total quantity of 5 represents an increase in the output of the light industrial good, with no 
decrease in quantities sold at the lower plan price to the privileged buyers, this is a Pareto-improving 
situation. 
  For the heavy industrial good, we have: 
market price      = 8 
market quantity   = 0 because the marginal cost exceeds the market price, 
plan price      = 7 
plan quantity       = 4. 
 
The total quantity produced remains at 4 with no losers and no winners.  So the overall situation from 
the DTPS is a Pareto-improving situation.   
 
Complete Price Liberalisation (big bang reform), as is clear from Diagrams 1 and 2, is not Pareto-
improving because the privileged buyers of both goods under rationing will now have to pay higher 
prices, there will be laid-off workers in the heavy industrial goods sector.  A big bang will cause a 
                                                 
4 As will be documented later, in 1988, the Soviet Union produced 15 times more crude steel per dollar of GDP than 
the United States, and 8 times more than West Germany and Japan.  The Soviet Union also produced five times 
more refined copper per dollar of GDP than the United States, West Germany and Japan.   7
collapse in the production of heavy industrial goods, and the resulting disorganisation (a la Blanchard and 
Kremer, 1997) could cause a temporary drop in the production of light industrial goods as well – a 
situation that is reminiscent of Poland and Russia upon the marketisation of their economies in January 
1990 and January 1992 respectively. 
The key lesson from the partial equilibrium analysis (PEA) is that partial price flexibility is superior 
to total price flexibility. 
  
The General Equilibrium Analysis (GEA) of Dual Track Pricing 
The inadequacy of PEA is obvious if these two goods comprise the entire production structure, and if 
there were full-employment and maximum production efficiency under the original central planning 
situation.  In this context, the introduction of dual-track pricing cannot cause an increase in the output of 
the light industrial good unless there is a decrease in the output of the heavy industrial good – and how 
could the occurrence of the latter still make the DTPS Pareto-improving? 
Lau, Qian and Roland (2000) answered this question by claiming that the light industrial good 
supplier will execute the following sequence of actions: 
(a)  go into the market for the heavy industrial good and buy (at the free market price) the rights to some 
of the planned output that was allocated to privileged consumers (at the free market price).  Say that 
he bought the rights to X units of the heavy industrial good. 
(b)  tell the heavy industrial good producer to reduce his production by X units and send the released 
workers to work in the light industrial good sector 
(c)  hire the newly released workers from the heavy industrial sector and expand the production of the 
light industrial good by Y units. 
The heavy industrial good producer is happy to cooperate because he now makes a positive profit 
from his costs having decreased more than his revenue.  One of the possible outcomes is that X=1 and Y 
= 3, which makes the dual tracking outcome the same as the free market outcome.  The important 
prediction is that the DTPS, in a general equilibrium setting, will cause one sector to expand and the other 
sector to shrink as in complete price liberalisation, and this DTPS-induced adjustment is contractual and 
mutually beneficial in nature.   
For policy purposes, both PEA and GEA offer the same advice: limited price deregulation is better 
than complete price deregulation.  Complete price deregulation might produce the same input allocation 
and output composition as the DTPS, but the former definitely generates resentment against the 
government while the latter does not. 
   8
Critique of the Preceding Two Analyses of the Dual Track Price System 
It is ironic that the supposedly flawed PEA is factually more correct than the theoretically coherent 
GEA.  Table 1 shows that the output of both the light and heavy industrial sectors went up every year 
following the introduction of the DTPS in 1985.
5  Light industrial output increased 64 percent in the 
1984-87 period, and heavy industrial output increased 55 percent.  The Lau, Qian and Roland's prediction 
of a (voluntary) contraction in heavy industrial output upon marketization of the economy is contradicted 
by the data, suggesting that their elaborate general equilibrium analysis could be an exercise in false 
precision.  Clearly, we need an explanation other than the DTPS to explain why China grew so fast upon 
marketization. 
Table 1 shows two interesting facts that suggest an alternative explanation for other issues. First, 
output from industrial SOEs increased every year in the reform era, but the state sector’s share of total 
industrial output declined secularly from 78 percent in 1978 to 28 percent in 1998.  This means that the 
bulk of the increase in industrial output came from the non-state sector.  Hence, fast growth of industrial 
output should not be attributed entirely to the incentive effect of dual-track pricing.  Most of the credit, in 
our judgement, should be given to the legalization of the dual-track ownership system in the industrial 
sector in 1984.  The legalization of non-state firms allowed non-state industrial enterprises to be 
established in the rural areas, the famous township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
Second, the non-state sector did not grow by obtaining their labor from the state sector through 
contractual agreements, the key mechanism behind the Lau, Qian and Roland's assertion of “gain without 
pain”.  State employment was 17.9 percent of the labor force in 1984 (the eve of the introduction of the 
DTPS to the industrial sector) and it rose to 18.3 percent in 1989 (the eve of the replacement of the DTPS 
with almost complete price decontrol).  The state sector in 1989 employed 14.7 million workers more 
than in 1984, and 26.6 million more than in 1978.  In employment terms, China was certainly not growing 
out of the plan either in absolute or in relative terms.
6 
The labor that fuelled the fast expansion of the non-state industrial sector came out from agriculture, a 
sector that was not identified either by Lau, Qian and Roland as an important contributor to China’s high 
growth rates after 1984.  Part A of Table 2 shows that employment in the primary sector declined from 71 
percent in 1978 to 50 percent in 1998.
7  Therein, we have the deus ex machina of China’s growth.  The 
marketization and internationalization of economic activities generated substantial productivity increases, 
not only by enlivening the agricultural sector in the 1979-84 period and by creating a dynamic non-state 
                                                 
5 The rise of the light industrial component of the industrial sector from 39 percent of total industrial output in 1978 
to 48 percent in 1988 and 51 percent in 1998 reflected, in part, its suppression under central planning. 
6 State employment was 109.5 million in 1996 compared with 74.5 million in 1978. 
7 This decline in agricultural employment is likely to be understated because it does not take illegal migration into 
account.   9
sector from 1984 onward, but also by moving low-productivity agricultural workers into higher-
productivity jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors.
8  In short, China’s marketization and 
internationalization policies initiated the non-zero sum process of economic development, moving China 
away from a subsistence peasant economy and causing agriculture to drop from 41 percent of GDP in 
1978 to 18 percent in 1998. 
Part B of Table 2 explains why Russia’s GDP fell upon marketization of its economy.  The Russian 
industrial sector, especially the heavy industrial component
9, was much bigger than what a market 
economy would require.  Industrial output accounted for 49 percent of Russia’s GDP in 1988 compared to 
24 percent of U.S. GDP in 1986.  Given the relatively small proportion of labor in Russian agriculture 
compared to China, 19 percent versus 71 percent, a substantial amount of the labor needed for the growth 
of new light industries and new service activities had to come from the heavy industrial sector.  The 
collapse of Russia’s heavy industries was necessary in order to release the labor put there by the central 
plan.
10  The salient point is that the marketization of the over-industrialised Russian economy triggered 
the almost zero-sum (certainly so, in the short run) process of economic restructuring. 
The importance of how existing structural conditions shape the output response to marketisation is 
captured in Diagram 3, which shows a three-dimensional production possibility frontier of output from 
agriculture, light industry and services, and heavy industry.  Point B on plane NOP denotes the production 
mix of a developed private market economy that is integrated into the international division of labor.  
Point A, which is also on plane NOP, represents Russia on the eve of its marketisation in 1992, and point 
C on plane KLM represents China in 1978.  The difference between plane NOP and plane KLM is that 
the former represents economies that are more advanced in their industrialisation and urbanisation. 
In Diagram 4, we show in a heuristic picture of that the movement from C to B is likely to be a less 
painful process than the movement from A to B.  We project the KLM plane onto the NOP plane to 
produce the K’OM’ plane, with C’ being the projection of C.  Within the context of the NOP plane, the 
movement from C’ to B is Pareto-improving, while the movement from A to B involves the shrinking of 
                                                 
8 Woo (1998) estimated that the reallocation of Chinese agricultural labor into industries and services added 1.3 
percentage points annually to the GDP growth rate over the 1985-93 period. 
9 This point is very well seen in the production of the following metals expressed in thousands of metric tons per US 
billion dollars of GDP for the following countries in 1988 (from Lipton and Sachs, 1992):  
Soviet     United     West 
Union     States     Germany     Japan 
Crude Steel     280.0     18.49     34.35       36.47 
Refined Copper     1.71     0.38     0.36       0.33 
Primary aluminum   4.28     0.80     0.62       0.01 
 
10 Sachs and Woo (1994) pointed out that there had to be a big cut in welfare subsidies provide by the government 
through the state enterprises before workers could be induced to seek employment in the new non-subsidized private 
sector.   10
the industrial sector.  More generally, the movement from C to A is Pareto-improving because the 
marginal value product of labor (MVPL) is lowest in agriculture.  Chow (1993) found the marginal value 
product of labor in China in 1978, measured in 1952 prices, to be 63 yuan in agriculture, 1027 yuan in 
industry, 452 yuan in construction, 739 yuan in transportation and 1809 yuan in commerce.  This is the 
true source of the Pareto-improving outcome in China’s economic reform, not the dual pricing system. 
 
An Important but Ignored Cost of the DTPS 
 One of the biggest claims of virtue for the DTPS is that by avoiding the creation of losers, it does not 
generate political opposition to economic reform (except, of course, from central planning ideologues).  
We find such a claim to be dubious because dual track pricing creates opportunities for corruption and 
serious corruption can undermine the political legitimacy of the government, if not also, the political 
stability of the country.  In our understanding of the history of Chinese reforms, the DTPS was an 
unsustainable economic mechanism, not only from the management viewpoint of extreme difficulties in 
administration, but also from the political viewpoint of maintaining the cohesion of the ruling coalition. 
To see this point, it is important to first note that the DTPS was only one component of the serious 
attempt (beginning in 1984) to improve the rationality of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) system, the 
other component was the devolution of decision-making power to the SOEs.   The political cost of the 
DTPS, as we will point out, came from its interaction with the operational autonomy of the SOEs in an 
unexpected way. 
The plan track for inputs conferred instant profits upon the favored purchaser upon reselling quota 
inputs in the free market.  Many children of top leaders were able to make purchases of inputs at plan 
prices, and re-sell them at large profits.  The general public was not happy with this widespread corrupt 
practice.  The devolution of operational autonomy to SOEs in a soft budget situation caused demand for 
investment credit to soar, and the accommodation by the state banks of this demand enabled inflation in 
1985-89 to reach levels not seen since 1949.
11   It was therefore natural that the general public linked the 
large illegal profits of the dual pricing system with the high inflation, and perceived the inflation to be the 
result of price gouging by corrupt officials.  This general perception brought public unhappiness with the 
corruption to new heights, which led to demonstrations against corruption and inflation in quite a number 
of large cities at the end of 1985 and 1986. 
To address this social unrest, Hu Yaobang, then head of the Communist Party of China (CPC), started 
arresting corrupt officials, and the sons of several top conservative leaders were apprehended.  This 
crackdown was interpreted by some conservative leaders as an excuse by the liberal faction to depose 
them, and this intensified the opposition to the continued leadership of Hu Yaobang on the grounds of   11
administrative incompetence (look at the high inflation) and ideological revisionism (look at his 
introduction of material incentives).  By aggravating the infighting inside the ruling coalition, the plan 
track contributed to the dismissal of Hu Yaobang as general secretary of the CPC in January 1987. 
It is worthwhile to quote two accounts of this matter at length.  According to Richard Baum (1994, 
p.176-177): 
"...[In 1986] Hu Yaobang raised the ire of Hu Qiaomu [Politburo member] by proposing to 
formally charge the latter's son, Hu Shiying, with criminal corruption ... [The] incident 
provoked an immediate reaction among powerful party elders..a campaign to oust Hu Yaobang 
quickly took shape.  At the same time, Hu Qiaomu reportedly threw himself at Deng Xiaoping's 
mercy, tearfully imploring the paramount leader to show mercy toward his errant offspring.. 
The highest level gaogan zidi [offspring of a high-ranking cadre] to be judicially 
punished was the daughter of General Ye Fei, the former commander of the Chinese Navy .. In 
1982 the general..had sharply criticized Hu Yaobang for failing to halt the spread of bourgeois 
liberalization. 
Other gaogan zidi who came under criminal investigation in this period included the 
prodigal offspring of conservative party elders Peng Zhen and Wang Zhen [both Politburo 
members].  Like Ye Fei and Hu Qiaomu, Peng and Wang had been vocal critics of bourgeois 
liberalization, and the raising of allegations of corruption against their children thus carried a 
strong hint of political retaliation." 
 
According to Joseph Fewsmith (1994, p.177): 
"In January 1986, Hu Yaobang presided over a huge rally of 8,000 cadres..called to address the 
issue of corruption... A special committee headed by Hu Yaobang's associate Qiao Shi was 
established within the Central Committee to root out corruption.  In February, ..three sons of 
high-level cadres were executed.  There were soon reports that the children of a number of 
conservative party leaders, including Peng Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, and Ye Fei, were under 
investigation, suggesting that Hu Yaobang was targeting his critics.  Moreover, the decision to 
set up a special committee within the Central Committee to tackle this issue appeared to be a 
challenge to the CDIC [Central Discipline Inspection Commission], headed by Chen Yun 
[leader of the conservative faction], as the agency of discipline within the party."  
 
Deng Xiaoping’s solution to the growing unrest within society and within the ruling coalition was 
not to arrest the profiteers but to end the dual-track price system that fostered such conflicts within the 
ruling coalition as a byproduct.  This is why, in the middle of unprecedented (since 1949) inflation, in 
May 1988 Deng Xiaoping publicly urged that comprehensive price reform be finished within three to five 
years.  The memorable slogan for this campaign was zhuang jiage guan (crash through the price 
obstacle).  
The reality was that the working of the dual-track price system generated great social pressures to 
punish the profiteers but such acts threatened the viability of the ruling coalition.  The choice facing the 
CPC elite was to either maintain the political coalition or maintain the dual track price system.  For the 
Chinese politicians, the choice was a no-brainer.  This is why price liberalization was brought to virtual 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Fan and Woo (1996) discuss this systemic proclivity toward high inflation.    12
completion in the 1990-91 period even though this was the time that the pro-plan conservative faction had 
the upper hand in policymaking (in the aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen incident).  Political reality 
is the reason why the plan track was reduced steadily even though this act was not Pareto-improving, and 
even though this contradicted the ideological position of the conservative faction.  
 
3. China's SOE Reform: Succeeding Where Others Have Failed? 
After the 1993 identification by the CPC that "ambiguity in property rights" had been a major factor 
behind the inefficiency of the SOE sector, significant privatisation of small and medium SOEs have 
occurred in a number of provinces.  The notion that SOEs are generally un-reformable and hence needed 
to be privatised has been, and still is
12, an issue of great debate among China analysts, as exemplified by 
the exchange between Woo, Fan, Hai and Jin (WFHJ, 1994) and Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (JRZ, 
1994) over WFHJ's (1993) rejection of JRZ's (1992) finding of positive total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth in the SOE sector.  
The WFHJ-JRZ debate started with the observation in WFHJ (1993) and Woo, Hai, Jin and Fan 
(WHJF, 1994) that the estimated deflators for value-added in JRZ (1992) and Groves, Hong, McMillan 
and Naughton (GHMN, 1994 and 1995), three studies that found large positive TFP growth in the 1980-
89 period, declined secularly over their sample periods when the consumer price index (CPI) rose 
steadily.  Such opposite trends between the CPI and the value-added deflators (VADS) created by JRZ's 
and GHMN's deflation methods is troubling because such occurrences are internationally unprecedented. 









I]    where 
Mt  = intermediate inputs in period t in physical units; 
Qt  = gross output in period t in physical units; 
Pi
G = price of gross output in period t, (with t = 0 the base period); and 
Pi
I  = price of intermediate input in period t.
13 
 







I]    where 
GVA0 = gross value added in time t measured in base prices; and 
GOV0  = gross output value in time t measured in base prices.  
 
                                                 
12 Recently, Nolan and Wang (1999) offered a positive assessment, while Chen (1998) offered a negative 
assessment. 
13 The legacy of central planning is that at the beginning of industrial reform, prices of intermediate inputs to 
industry were artificially suppressed and prices of industrial goods artificially raised in order to concentrate revenue 
in the industrial sector to make revenue collection convenient for the state.  So we expect [P0
IMt/P0
GQt] to be much 
smaller than unity.    13
WHJF suggested that the high TFP growth in JRZ (1992) and GHMN (1994, 1995) and the declining 
VAD were the joint results of under-deflating gross output and over-deflating intermediate inputs.  This 
suggestion implicitly assumed that China’s production structure (GVA0/GOV0) was similar to that in 
other economies in order to produce positive co-movements between VAD and CPI.   
JRZ (1996) rejected WHJF's suggestion of incorrect deflation, and attributed the declining VAD to 
China’s industrial structure differing significantly from those in the advanced market economies.  The 
alleged Chinese economic exceptionalism is that China's manufacturing sector had an usually low 
(GVA/GVO) ratio, and they computed it to be 46% for the United States, 40% for Japan, 45% for West 
Germany and 44% for the United Kingdom compared to the (GVA/GOV) ratio for China, which was 
33% in 1980, 31% in 1984, 29% in 1988, and 25% in 1992. 
We identify two difficulties with JRZ (1996)’s defence.  The first difficulty is that the definition of 
the official Chinese value added data used by JRZ (1996) may be different from the definition of value 
added used in the advanced market economies.  Specifically, there are two commonly used definitions of 
value added in China, one excludes some payments to intermediate factors and the other definition 
includes them.  We will call them GVA-1 and GVA-2 respectively.  GVA-2 matches the way that the US 
Census calculates GVA, and the US (GVA/GOV) ratio cited by JRZ had the GVA calculated as GVA-2.  
Now if the official ratios for China reported in JRZ were constructed using GVA-1, then it is not 
surprising that (GVA/GOV) is so low in China compared to the U.S.A – but then this would be a 
comparison of apples and oranges. 
The second difficulty with JRZ's finding of an unusual industrial structure for China, even if their 
value added data was constructed with the second Chinese definition, is that this is a very fragile finding, 
not a definitive finding.  JRZ's proposition, which is based on Industrial Yearbook data, does not hold 
when the 1987 Input-Output Table data are used instead.  The Industrial Yearbook data are based on the 
financial reports (similar to information given to the industrial census) filed by the enterprises, while the 
Input-Output Table data adjusted the industrial census data to be compatible with economy-wide input-
output flows. 
Table 3 reports the GVA/GOV ratio for different sectors calculated from different sources and 
according to different definitions of GVA.  Column (i) reports the ratio as reported in the 1987 Industrial 
Yearbook (JRZ’s data source).  The ratios in column (ii) and (iii) are calculated from the Input-Output 
Table.  Column (ii) is calculated using GVA-1 (i.e. using the Chinese national account method), and 
column (iii) is calculated using GVA-2 (i.e. using the US Census method).
14   The 1987 (GVA/GOV) 
ratio for the Chinese industrial sector was 26.5 percent according to the Industrial Yearbook, 31.4 percent 
according to the Chinese national account method, and 42 percent according to the US Census method.    14
The 1987 ratio for the U.S.A. using the US Census method was 44 percent.  Table 3 also shows that each 
of China's industrial sectoral (GVA/GOV) ratios calculated according to the US Census method was not 
only larger than the (GVA/GOV) ratios from the Industrial Yearbook but also closer to the US sectoral 
(GVA/GOV) ratios.  When we know that the Chinese and US GVAs are calculated in the same way, there 
are no great differences between the industrial structures of the two countries. 
JRZ's finding of low and secularly declining (GVA/GOV) ratio for China suggests to us under-
measurement of GVA caused by the growing appropriation of capital income by SOE personnel.  Fan and 
Woo (1996) have shown that one unintended result of granting increasing operational autonomy to the 
SOE managers is that they have, over time, learned how to use various accounting subterfuges to 
overstate production costs in order to transfer enterprise income to themselves and the workers.  This is 
why (GVA/GOV) calculated from the financial information supplied by the enterprises has been 
declining steadily in the reform period, and why the adjustment of GVA, to be compatible with economy-
wide flows, produced much higher (GVA/GOV).  This also explains why China's SOEs have been 
running greater losses every year, even in years of high growth and in sectors where entry by non-state 
enterprises has been minimal.
15 
In our opinion, this steady stripping of state assets may subvert political legitimacy much more than a 
transparent method of privatization would.  The increasing public outrage over the inequity of the 
informal privatization of the SOE sector is well captured in a recent book by He Qinglian who wrote that 
the SOE reform has amounted to: 
“a process in which power-holders and their hangers-on plundered public wealth.  The primary target 
of their plunder was state property that had been accumulated from forty years of the people’s sweat, 
and their primary mean of plunder was political power.”
16 
 
Just like their compatriots in EEFSU, Chinese SOE managers focus more on the looting of their firms 
than on improving their operations.  In a study of SOEs in Chongqing, Chen (1998) reported: 
"Municipal officials often find that factory directors appointed to money-losing firms do well and 
bring the firms out of the red in the first two years, and then start to take part in graft, embezzlement, 
bribery and, most frequently, pirating state assets." 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Ren Ruoen (private communications) calculated column (ii) and (iii) of Table 3. 
15 JRZ (1994, pp.240) criticized WFHJ (1993) for using a survey of urban residents to calculate the indirect income 
of SOE workers because the data included “earning from second jobs, royalties, lecture fees, and transfer 
payments.”  What WFHJ (1994) did not mention in their reply was that this criticism was invalid because JRZ 
thought that WFHJ (1993) were using Table 8 in Zhao (1992) when WFHJ were actually using Table 9 - which was 
based on the bank records of SOE transactions, and hence did not contain information on the "typical" worker’s 
income from royalties and lecture fees. 
16 He Qinglian, Zhongguo de Xianjing, (China’s Pitfall), Mingjing Chubanshe, Hong Kong.  The translated quote is 
from Liu Binyan and Perry Link, “China: The Great Backward?” The New York Review of Books, October 8, 1998, 
pp. 19.   15
For practical purposes, the TFP debate is over.  There is now no doubt about which side of the debate 
the Chinese government has come out on.  Premier Zhu Rongji declared back in 1996, right after four 
years of double digit economic growth, that: 
“The current problems of SOEs are excessive investments in fixed assets with very low return rates, 
resulting in the sinking of large amounts of capital; low sales-to-production ratio giving rise to 
mounting inventories.  The end result is that the state has to inject an increasing amount of working 
capital through the banking sector into the state enterprises.”
17 
The announcement at the 15
th CPC Congress in September 1997 that there would be a determined 
effort to greatly diversify the ownership structure was the logical outcome of the above official verdict on 
the performance of the SOE sector, and of official concern about the political repercussions of the 
accelerating process of spontaneous privatization. 
 
Facing the Perils of Privatization, Chinese-Style 
There are two analytical divides in describing the wide array of privatization practices.  The first 
divide is between individual sales and mass privatization
18; and the second divide is between insider 
privatization and outsider privatization.  These two divides are not mutually exclusive.  Management and 
employee buy-outs are insider privatizations and direct sales to third parties are outsider privatizations.  
Voucher privatizations with generous concessions to employees of the SOEs are insider privatizations 
(e.g. Russia), and voucher privatizations conducted on a level playing field (e.g. the Czech Republic) are 
outsider privatizations.  For some transition economies, mass privatization had appeared attractive 
because individual sales, in the absence of developed capital markets, would have taken too long and the 
perverse incentives facing the SOEs awaiting privatization would have generated management problems 
beyond the governments' ability to handle.  
The experiences with mass privatization in Eastern European and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) 
show that the task is an extremely difficult one and that the outcomes have consistently fallen below 
initial expectations.  For example, in Russia, the “loans-for-shares” privatization transferred the country's 
enormous mineral wealth to a group of oligarchs, and the weak administrative and legal structures 
allowed many managers to take effective control of the privatized firms and loot them instead of 
improving their operations.  In the judgment of Frydman and Rapaczynski (1998), despite the diverse 
privatization methods, the outcome in most cases in the majority of the countries (especially in FSU) is 
that control of the firms went to some form of manager-labor coalition, producing what they aptly 
                                                 
17 "Guo you qiye sheng hua gaige ke burong huan," (No time shall be lost in further reforming state owned enterprises), 
speech at the 4th meeting of the 8th People's Congress, People's Daily, Overseas Edition, March 11, 1996.  
18 Mass privatisation of course does not mean unloading all the SOEs at once, it means selling a large block of the 
SOE sector in each session.   16
described as “capitalism with a comrade face.”  Privatization has certainly not unleashed massive 
productivity increases. 
Furthermore, the EEFSU experiences warn that mass privatization is an exceedingly dangerous 
business politically, no matter how it is done, be it outsider privatization or insider privatization. This is 
because the mass privatization of SOEs generates so much rent that corruption is impossible to avoid, and 
the resulting corruption inevitably delegitimises the government. Corruption leading to political demise 
appears to be an inevitable byproduct of mass privatization, e.g. Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic and 
Anatoli Chubais in Russia. 
Most scholars of enterprise restructuring would now agree that privatization is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for improved enterprise performance.  The emergence of a dynamic privately owned 
industrial sector from the old SOE sector requires the existence of hard budget constraints, competition, 
and legal (e.g. bankruptcy courts) and commercial (e.g. accounting standards) institutions that work 
properly.  Since China, like most transition economies, has either inchoate or inexperienced 
administrative, legal, and economic institutions, does this mean that it should not have began 
privatization; least of all, to have accelerated the pace of it recently? 
We see two reasons for why the non-stellar outcomes in EEFSU have not discouraged China from 
moving ahead with privatization.  The first reason comes from John Nellis (1999) who points out that 
“governments that botch privatization are equally likely to botch the management of state-owned firms”.  
The answer is not to avoid privatizations but to implement more careful privatizations: governments in 
transition economies should “push ahead, more slowly, with case-by-case and tender privatizations, in 
cooperation with the international assistance community, in hopes of producing some success stories that 
will lead by example.” 
The second reason lies in that the delay of privatization can be costly to the government politically.  
Stealing by managers does occur during privatization and creates a social backlash against the 
government, but the maintenance of the status quo has become increasingly difficult because SOE 
managers in China know from the EEFSU experience that they are in an endgame situation.  The 
widespread spontaneous privatization by SOE managers could create the same social unrest that would 
topple the regime. 
China has so far avoided widespread organized public dissatisfaction with its partial privatization of 
the small and medium state enterprises.  The central government has given itself an indirect role in the 
privatization process in order to avoid bearing the brunt of any negative fallout.  It works by the central 
government passing to the local governments the financial responsibility for most of the state enterprises 
located in their areas.  In the case of loss-making enterprises, the local government is forced to either 
come up with a subsidy or privatize them.  The second option has been the common choice.  The local   17
party secretary who gets rid of the loss-makers without arousing local resentment is promoted.  But if 
there is substantial public resentment over the privatization, then the party secretary is reprimanded or 
replaced for inept implementation of state policy. 
The question is whether this strategy can continue to shelter the central government from the public 
backlash over “inept” privatization, especially when the large state enterprises are privatized?  The road to 
a prototype WTO market is a perilous one for China's policymakers, but it is an unavoidable journey if 
China is to continue moving up the value-added ladder and become a modern market economy.  
 
4. Fiscal Contracting: The Newest Lesson from China to Russia? 
A number of China scholars have observed that local governments in China have been a primary 
force for economic development.  This phenomenon has been called “developmental localism” by Zheng 
(1994), “local corporatism” by Oi (1992) and “market-preserving federalism” by Montinola, Qian and 
Weingast (1995).  The pro-growth policies of China’s local governments stand in sharp contrast with the 
“status quo” policies of Russia’s local governments.  According to a comprehensive analysis of ten 
sectors of the Russian economy in 1999, the McKinsey Global Institute (1999) found that: 
“In nine of the ten sectors, the direct cause of the low economic performance is market distortions 
that prevent equal competition.  The distortions come from attempts to address social concerns, 
corrupt practices, and lack of information. 
In the manufacturing sectors, regional governments channel implicit federal subsidies to 
unproductive companies.  Such subsidies take the form of lower energy payments and are allegedly 
intended to prevent companies from shutting down and laying off employees.  This puts potentially 
productive companies at a cost disadvantage, blocking investments and growth on their part. 
In the service sectors, where employment should grow, investments by efficient companies are 
discouraged by the presence of well connected unproductive incumbents who benefit from favorable 
regulations, weak law enforcement, and privileged access to land or government procurements. 
Furthermore, these sector level market distortions are key contributors to macroeconomic 
instability, because they reduce government revenues and increase its expenditures.  Macroeconomic 
instability itself is another important deterrent to investments. 
We found the other often mentioned reasons for Russia’s economic problems to play a much 
smaller role (e.g. poor corporate governance and lack of a transport infrastructure).” 
 
The prevailing opinion among China scholars is that the enthusiasm of China’s local government’s 
for economic development came from post-1978 changes in the fiscal relationship between the central 
and local governments that allowed the latter to keep a greater proportion of the taxes that it collected for 
the central government.  The extreme examples of fiscal decentralization were Guangdong and Fujian 
who, for long periods in the 1980s, paid fixed lump sum taxes and kept all tax revenue above the quota, 
i.e. a marginal retention rate (MRR) of 100 percent. 
Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999) found in cross-provincial regressions that MRR was positively linked 
with employment growth in non-state enterprises, and with the degree of SOE restructuring during the   18
1982-92 period.  They claimed that the absence of Chinese-style fiscal contracting (market-preserving 
federalism) in Russia is the reason for the “status quo” policies of Russia’s local governments.  Is this the 
real lesson from China for Russia in the wake of earlier lessons that turned out to be inapplicable?
19 
In the judgment of Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), Chinese-style federalism cannot work in Russia 
because Russia is now a democratic state and no longer a Leninist state like China.  To see their 
argument, suppose that the local government in a transition economy faces the following two policy 
choices: 
•  policy X that requires the local government to prey on private businesses to pay for its 
expenditure and support the local SOEs that employ a significant proportion of the local work 
force; and  
•  policy Y that requires the local government to reduce protection and subsidies to local SOEs (in 
order to force them to increase efficiency by laying off workers), and to foster growth of new 
private enterprises by cutting taxes and fees (an action made affordable by the cuts in SOE 
subsidies). 
Now assume the following consequences: 
•  policy X yields direct benefits to the local government worth bx , and the probability px that the local 
government will stay in power. 
•  policy Y yields direct benefits worth by , which is a positive function of MRR, and the probability py 
that the local government will stay in power. 
Obviously, policy Y will be enacted only if  
py by > px bx ,  
or     pby    > bx                  where p= (py / px ). 
In a Leninist state, p is a policy variable because the central government appoints the local governor, 
which is the situation in China.  So if the central government wishes policy Y to be chosen, it just sets px 
= 0 (as long as by is positive).  Ceteris paribus, an increase in MRR increases by , and hence the 
probability that policy Y will be chosen by the governor, but the level of the MRR is really just “icing on 
the cake” for a local governor in a Leninist state. 
Whereas in a town in a democratic country where the local SOEs employ a large proportion of the 
workforce, py may well be sufficiently close to zero such that jacking up MRR tremendously by the 
central government will not be enough to induce the local government to choose policy Y.   
It is interesting to note that in a country where the central government is committed to maximizing 
GDP growth, the relationship between MRR and the provincial growth rate may be one where causality 
                                                 
19 See Woo (1994) for a discussion of some of the commonly claimed “lessons from China” for Russia and Eastern 
Europe.   19
runs both ways.  The minimisation of revenue losses from the use of MRR to promote the overall GDP 
growth rate would lead the central government to extend lower MRRs to provinces that have higher 
growth potential.  The higher MRRs given to the southeastern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian 
could well have been based on this consideration. 
The key regressions in Jin, Qian and Weingast are essentially growth equations because the growth 
rates of provincial employment in the non-state non-agricultural sector are highly correlated with the 
growth rates of provincial GDP.  The Jin, Qian and Weingast regressions do not contain any of the usual 
independent variables found in Barro-type growth equations, however.  Chen (2000) added MRR and 
other proxies for fiscal decentralization into Barro-type provincial growth regressions and found all of 
them to have significant negative coefficients over the 1979-93 period.  Chen also cited two studies by 
Justine Lin that found contradictory results about the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth.  All of these suggest that the empirical case for the effectiveness of fiscal contracting in 
promoting provincial growth is a fragile one, and that more research is needed. 
A priori, the relationship between MRR and the growth rate in China could well be a Laffer-type 
curve.  In some provinces, the larger amount of retained revenue could have resulted in more white 
elephant projects or larger subsidies to inefficient large SOEs that were deemed too big to fail.  The 
negative coefficient for MRR in Chen’s (2000) growth regressions is a warning that China might well 
have exceeded the optimal value of MRR by the end of the 1980s. 
We are of course not denying either that the 1982-93 system of “tax farming” was better than the pre-
1979 tax system, or that it stimulated the appetites of some local governments for economic development.  
Our point is just that China deserved a better tax system than the 1982-93 tax system of annual 
negotiations with individual provinces – a system that created extraordinary microeconomic distortions 
and a fiscal crisis for the central government to boot.
20   These flaws explain why China replaced fiscal 
contracting in January 1994 with a tax system that has the value-added tax (VAT) as its centerpiece.  The 
1983-93 Chinese tax system extolled in Jin, Qian and Weingast was similar to the tax farming system of 
medieval Europe, and the post-1993 Chinese tax system (at least on paper and in intentions) is similar to 
the tax systems of modern Europe.  The right lesson for fiscal reform in Russia
21 is the same lesson that 
China has learned over the last two decades, which is to allow its fiscal system to converge to those of the 
advanced WTO members. 
 
5. Gorbachev’s Application of Chinese-Style Reforms: Two Lessons from Russia to China 
                                                 
20 Tsai (2000) has suggested that "market-thwarting federalism" might be a more accurate description of this system.  
See also Wong (1991) and Wong, Heady and Woo (1995).   20
It would be historically inaccurate to assume that market reforms in Russia started only in 1992 with 
the Boris Yeltsin government.  The gross inefficiency of the Soviet economy and its slide into 
technological stagnation during the nomenklatura communism of Leonid Brezhnez in the 1970s had 
fermented much reformist thinking among Soviet economists.  By the time Mikhail Gorbachev assumed 
political power in May 1985, there were already many established influential economists urging market-
oriented reforms, e.g. Boris Kurashvili argued for Hungarian-style market socialism, and Oleg 
Bogomolov for Chinese-style incremental liberalization. 
Gorbachev was not a quick convert to market reforms, however.  The first two years of his rule were 
spent trying to propel the economy out of its doldrums by accelerating the technological level of Soviet 
industries through large investments in the machine tool industry.  The acceleration strategy failed, 
leading Gorbachev to seek “radical reforms” of the economy.  The influence of China’s reform strategy is 
clearly seen in Gorbachev’s arguments in August 1987 “in favor of family contract, family teams and … 
leasehold”
22 to be introduced in Soviet agriculture.  Gorbachev’s radical reform program was unveiled in 
June 1987 at the Soviet economic plenum, which passed the Law on State Enterprises and Basic 
Provisions for Fundamental Perestroika of Economic Management to devolve decision-making power 
from the ministries to the SOEs.  Just like in China, Soviet SOEs were given more freedom in their output 
choices, and freedom to enter into long-term contractual agreements for purchases and sales; and were 
allowed to retain part of their profits to use at their discretion e.g. for technological upgrading, and as 
incentive bonuses.  In return, the SOEs were required to do “full economic accounting”, the euphemism 
for SOEs to be responsible for their losses.  As in China, deliveries to the state would still be required 
(state orders), for which subsidized inputs would be made available to the SOEs, but state orders would 
be reduced over time to cover only 40-60 percent of all production.
23 
The explosive growth China’s non-state industrial sector had made a deep impression on the Russian 
reformers and inspired them to push for a double track on ownership as well.  Academician Leonid 
Abalkin, a prominent leader in reform thinking, predicted in 1986 that the radical reforms of Gorbachev 
would, within a decade, enable cooperatives to account for 10 percent of GDP, and private enterprises for 
4 percent of GDP.
24  Various decrees had been issued earlier to stimulate the cooperative sector, and they 
were greatly expanded with the adoption of the Law on Cooperatives in May 1988. 
The Law on Cooperatives was categorical in making the formation of cooperatives an easy task: “A 
cooperative is organized at the desire of citizens, exclusively on a voluntary basis.  The creation of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Medieval-style tax farming is still inappropriate for the present Russian economic situation even if one agrees 
with the "industrial feudalism" characterisation of it by Ericson (1999a). 
22 Aslund (1991, pp103) 
23 Ellman and Kontorovich (1998, pp103); but Aslund (1991, pp. 127) reported the intended range to be 50-70 
percent.   21
cooperative is not conditional upon any special permission whatsoever by Soviet, economic or other 
bodies.”
25  There was no ceiling set on the number of members, and there was no limit on the number of 
non-members that could be hired on contract.  Furthermore, cooperatives could set their prices according 
to market conditions.  In the words of Yevgenii Yasin, a senior member of the State Commission on 
Economic Reform: 
“The 1987 reform was in many ways an attempt to implement the Chinese model in Russia.  It 
envisioned enterprises, and joint ventures would constitute the free sector, existing alongside the state 
sector, with its mandatory state orders, fixed prices, and centralized allocation of inputs.”  (Ellman 
and Kontorovich, 1998, pp.169) 
 
The Soviet economy started disintegrating from 1989 onward
26, however, and, broadly speaking, 
there are two explanations about the causes: one, Gorbachev’s Chinese-style reforms unraveled the Soviet 
economy; and, two, the reforms would have worked if Gorbachev had only tightened repression on his 
opponents instead of embracing glasnost. 
The claim that the reforms caused the collapse comes from two related views about the Soviet 
economy.  The first view is that the existing heavy industrial sector was too large for a marketized Soviet 
economy, as depicted in Diagram 3.  This sector had to shrink because its value added at market prices 
was negative.  Ericson’s (1999b) careful examination of the changes in Russia’s input-output table in 
1991-1992 and Berg, Borensztein, Sahay and Zettelmeyer's (1999) thorough econometric investigation of 
EEFSU economies support this value-subtracting view of the Soviet-type industrial sector. 
The second view is more general, and is based on Kornai's (1992) argument that systemic stability is 
assured only when the regime in the political sphere is compatible with the regime in the economic 
sphere.  A totalitarian Communist regime that is ideologically committed to the suppression of private 
ownership requires for its sustenance a centrally-planned economy, and vice-versa.  If the nature of the 
regime changes in only one sphere, then the stability of the regime in the other sphere will be disturbed, 
culminating into systemic collapse.  This means that unless partial marketization is matched by an 
appropriate modification in Communist ideology, either the economic reform will be reversed or the 
existing political regime will be toppled.  Hence, in Kornai’s framework, the 1987 Chinese-style reforms 
removed the last vestiges of coherence within the Soviet political-economy system and precipitated its 
collapse. 
The counter-hypothesis to the views of Ericson and Kornai holds that the Chinese-style reforms 
would have effected a less costly economic transition for Russia if Gorbachev had only intensified the 
police state nature of Soviet society instead of lessening it as he did, e.g. Griffin and Khan (1993).  The 
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reasoning is that a systemic transformation necessarily creates losers, firm political control is therefore 
required to prevent the losers from creating social instability that would disrupt production.  This 
viewpoint was echoed by Yevgenii Yasin: 
“a gradual transition to a market economy [would have required … a less radical and painful 
departure from socialist ideals.  The secret police and censorship would perpetuate the old ideological 
cocoon, within which a new economic system would be developing like a butterfly…  The last chance 
was lost in 1989, when Gorbachev’s political reform removed the Communist Party from power.  
Afterwards, events unfolded spontaneously, no longer under the control of the government or the 
Party.”  (Ellman and Kontorovich, 1998, pp.169) 
 
The first serious problem with the view that political liberalization undermines economic 
liberalization is the limited validity of the assumption that only a totalitarian political regime can maintain 
adequate law and order in a society going through economic restructuring.  The jackboot of military rule 
could not prevent Ceausescu of Romania and Soeharto of Indonesia from being deposed by their angry 
populace.  Staying in power requires more than the liberal use of the stick.  History clearly shows that 
carrots and compromise can sometimes be even more crucial. 
The second serious problem with the necessity-for-brute-force hypotheses is that it ignores the fact 
that the bludgeoning cannot be confined just to laid-off state workers on strike, substantial amounts of it 
would also have to be directed at members of the Communist elite.  This is because many Soviet officials 
who stood to lose their supervisory power over the SOEs had joined the Communist ideologues in 
sabotaging the implementation of the reforms.
27  Would the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have 
accepted Stalin-style purges by Gorbachev in his de-Stalinization of the economy?  A positive answer is 
highly debatable because of the seemingly ironclad self-protective consensus of “live and let live” among 
the post-Stalin Communist elite. 
In trying to assess the relative merits of these two broad explanations for the disintegration of the 
Soviet economy, it is instructive to note how Gorbachev reacted to the failure of his Chinese-style 
reforms.  He first replaced democratic centralism with open popular elections, and then authorized 
Academician Stanislav Shatalin to draft a plan that would transform the planned economy to a market 
economy in 500 days.
28  These actions suggest that Gorbachev had concluded that the biggest obstacle to 
the development of a market economy was the Communist Party itself, and that gradual reforms could not 
work in the Soviet Union. 
Of the many interesting lessons for China from Gorbachev’s unsuccessful Chinese-style reforms, we 
single out two that concern the viability of continued deepening of economic reform and opening.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 For contemporary accounts, see Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency (1989 and 1990).  
Malia (1994) gives an excellent analysis of the politics of the period. 
27 See accounts by Vladimir Mozhin and Vadim Medvedev in Ellman and Kontorovich (1988, pp.151-154). 
28 For details, see Yavlinsky et al (1990).   23
first lesson derives from the fundamental message in Kornai’s (1992) analysis that true systemic stability 
requires that the political regime be compatible with the economic regime.  Sustained economic 
prosperity requires a market economy that is integrated into the international economy, and a true market 
economy requires (constitutionally-protected) private ownership to be its institutional norm.  The lesson 
for China from Russia is that the avoidance of economic disruptions from political upheavals lies in the 
willingness and ability of the ruling elite to make adroit changes to the nature of the political regime to 
accompany the changes in the economic regime.  Seen in this light, China’s aggressive push for WTO 
membership, the recent revision of China’s constitution to give private property the same legal status as 
public property, and the reduction of the central bureaucracy by over a third since 1995 are signs of far-
sightedness in the third-generation of Chinese leaders. 
The second lesson for China from Gorbachev’s reforms derives from the fact that the primary 
political opposition to marketization came from within the Party and that the primary resistance to 
implementation of reforms came from within the government.  Because the policy dissent and 
implementation sabotage are of the in-house variety, purges could destroy the internal unity required for 
the political survival of the ruling elite, and for maintaining stable center-provincial political 
arrangements.  The second lesson is that the fourth generation of Chinese leaders will have to come up 
with creative mechanisms to offset the natural proclivity of loyal party incumbents to favor the status quo 
over additional institutional reforms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The desirability of WTO membership for China depends on whether its economic successes to date 
are the result of its discovery of new institutional forms (e.g. dual track pricing, SOE contracts, and fiscal 
contracts) that are optimal for China's particular economic circumstances, or are the result of the 
convergence of its economic institutions to those of a typical advanced member of WTO.   If the 
experimentalist interpretation is correct, then the institutional harmonization required by WTO may blunt 
future growth; and if the convergence explanation is true, then WTO membership will help future growth. 
Our dismissal of some recent claims of Chinese economic exceptionalism can be summarized as 
follows.  The data do not support the general equilibrium effects of the DTPS as predicted by the "gain 
without pain" analysis of Lau, Qian and Roland (2000).  The serious flaw of the DTPS that has been 
downplayed in their paper was the widespread corruption that it spawned, and the political disunity that 
the corruption created.  It was because of the economic and political unsustainability of the DTPS that it 
was replaced by complete price liberalization in 1990-91, despite the fact that this was not a Pareto-
improving change.   24
Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1996) defended their finding of a significant positive TFP growth rate 
from charges of implausibility by claiming that China's industrial structure was markedly different from 
those of the advanced capitalist economies.  Their claim does not hold when the industrial structure is 
calculated from Input-Output data.  In a way, the recent acceleration of privatization in China definitively 
settles the argument of whose estimation results are more plausible.  Since the EEFSU experience shows 
that privatization can be politically dangerous for the government implementing it, this new direction in 
SOE reform will require unusually skillful political management by the Chinese leadership. 
The fiscal decentralization that took the form of province-specific tax contracts rendered the revenue 
of the local governments more dependent on the local level of economic development, and hence induced 
many of them to promote local growth.  The negative byproducts of the tax contracts were local 
protectionism, industrial duplication, and a great reduction in the ability of the central government to 
undertake pressing infrastructure investments and poverty alleviation projects.  Finally, the empirical 
validity of the positive growth impact of fiscal decentralization, after the influences of other variables are 
controlled for, is still an open question.   
The uniform tax system introduced in 1994, which is similar to the tax systems of the advanced 
members of the WTO, is a definite improvement over its predecessor.  So if there is any lesson for Russia 
to learn from China's fiscal decentralization, as claimed by Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999), it should be 
based on the present tax system and not on the pre-1994 tax system.  In any case, as pointed out by 
Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), it is unlikely that the kind of decentralized tax system designed for a 
politically-centralized country will produce the same outcomes when applied to a politically-decentralized 
country. 
The failure of Gorbachev's 1987 reforms suggests, first, the limited applicability of China's double 
track transition strategy to EEFSU economies, and, second, that the greatest challenge to the deepening of 
economic reform and opening may come from the entrenched interests within the ruling structure.  
China's forthcoming WTO accession could be seen as an attempt by reformers to lock economic policies 
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Table 1: Production of Light and Heavy Industrial Goods, and State Sector Employment, 1978-1998
Index of Gross Industrial Composition of Gross Industrial Proportion of  Proportion of 
 Output, 1978=100  Output, in 1995 prices, % Labor Force in Gross Industrial
State-Owned Production by
Units, % State-Owned Units,
Light Heavy Light Heavy current prices,%
Industry Industry Industry Industry
1978 100.0 100.0 38.9 61.1 18.6 77.6
1979 110.0 108.0 39.3 60.7 18.8 78.5
1980 130.8 110.1 43.1 56.9 18.9 76.0
1981 149.5 105.1 47.5 52.5 19.1 74.8
1982 158.2 115.5 46.6 53.4 19.1 74.4
1983 172.9 130.6 45.7 54.3 18.9 73.4
1984 200.7 152.2 45.6 54.4 17.9 69.1
1985 246.3 182.9 46.1 53.9 18.0 64.9
1986 278.5 201.6 46.8 53.2 18.2 62.3
1987 330.3 235.3 47.2 52.8 18.3 59.7
1988 403.3 280.9 47.7 52.3 18.4 56.8
1989 436.4 305.9 47.6 52.4 18.3 56.1
1990 476.6 324.9 48.3 51.7 16.2 54.6
1991 548.0 372.0 48.4 51.6 16.5 56.2
1992 657.7 479.8 46.6 53.4 16.6 51.5
1993 835.2 611.8 46.5 53.5 16.5 57.3
1994 1,032.3 762.3 46.3 53.7 16.2 37.3
1995 1,268.7 899.5 47.3 52.7 16.1 34.0
1996 1,573.2 1,013.7 49.7 50.3 15.9 36.3
1997 1,801.3 1,132.4 50.3 49.7 15.5 31.6
1998 2,013.9 1,242.2 50.8 49.2 12.6 28.2
Data caluculated from State Statistics Bureau (1999)  29
 
Table 2: Production in Employment Structure in China, Soviet Union and United States
Part A: China: Change in Production and Employment, 1978-1998
Composition of GDP, 1995 prices, % Composition of Employment, %
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
1978 41.2 34.0 24.7 70.5 17.3 12.2
1979 40.9 34.2 24.9 69.8 17.6 12.6
1980 38.0 37.0 24.9 68.7 18.2 13.1
1981 38.4 35.6 26.0 68.1 18.3 13.6
1982 39.0 34.2 26.7 68.1 18.4 13.4
1983 38.1 34.2 27.8 67.1 18.7 14.2
1984 37.3 33.9 28.8 64.0 19.9 16.1
1985 33.8 35.9 30.3 62.4 20.8 16.8
1986 32.2 36.5 31.3 60.9 21.9 17.2
1987 30.3 37.5 32.2 60.0 22.2 17.8
1988 28.2 38.8 33.0 59.4 22.4 18.3
1989 28.0 38.4 33.6 60.0 21.6 18.3
1990 28.9 38.0 33.0 60.1 21.4 18.5
1991 27.2 39.7 33.0 59.7 21.4 18.9
1992 25.1 42.3 32.6 58.5 21.7 19.8
1993 23.2 44.8 31.9 56.4 22.4 21.2
1994 21.5 47.3 31.2 54.3 22.7 23.0
1995 20.5 48.8 30.7 52.2 23.0 24.8
1996 19.7 50.0 30.3 50.5 23.5 26.0
1997 18.8 50.7 30.5 49.9 23.7 26.4
1998 18.1 51.5 30.4 49.8 23.5 26.7
Part B: Cross-Country Comparison of Production and Employment Structure
Composition of GDP, 1995 prices, % Composition of Employment, %
United Soviet China United Soviet China
States Union States Union
1986 1988 1978 1986 1988 1978
Agriculture 1.9 9.3 41.2 2.7 19.3 70.5
Industry 23.5 48.9 28.9 17.6 28.9 17.3*
Contruction 6.1 10.7 5.1 4.6 11.5 **
Services 68.5 31.1 24.7 75.1 40.3 12.2
China data from State Statistic Bureau (1999).  Statistics for United States and Soviet Union
  are from Lipton and Sachs (1992).




Table 3:  Ratio of Gross Value Added to Gross Output Value (GVA/GVO, in percent) in 1987
(data supplied by Ren Ruoen)
Chinese ratios calculated from different data US ratio
sources and under different concepts
source of data industrial yearbook input-output table     US 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
method of calculating not national  US  US 
   gross value added really account census census
known concept concept concept
Food Manufacturing 13.48 14.94 27.63 32.85
Beverages 25.02 33.55 45.62 44.61
Tobacco Products 5.46 67.10 73.37 64.27
Textile Mill Products 19.21 25.63 35.51 38.84
Wearing Apparel 26.51 29.40 38.81 48.65
Leather Products and Footwear 24.19 27.37 38.97 47.94
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 26.62 31.84 40.75 43.92
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 28.29 32.19 41.14 55.28
Chemicals Products (incl. oil refining) 27.17 35.11 51.06 29.85
Rubber and Plastic Products 25.55 29.34 38.37 50.06
Non-metallic Mineral Products  40.37 40.98 49.06 52.40
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 27.05 32.36 39.86 42.94
Machniery & Tansport Equipment 33.39 34.00 42.53 44.79
Electrical Machinery & Equipment 29.08 29.03 37.86 55.33
Other Manufacturing Industries 33.20 37.11 46.00 62.78
Total Manufacturing Industries 26.49 31.43 41.62 43.86
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